This paper analyzes the role of large trader activity in predicting bull and bear markets. For commodity futures which have experienced dramatic price swings in recent years, we estimate a Markov regime-switching model to distinguish between two regimes: a bear market characterized by negative returns and high volatility, and a bull market, characterized by positive returns and low volatility. We specifically allow the transition probabilities to be time varying as function of the trading activities of hedge funds and swap dealers-two types of institutions commonly believed to bring information to futures markets. We find that trading activities of hedge funds contain valuable information for identifying different regimes.
I.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether institutional trading sheds light on the transition between different market regimes, e.g. bull vs bear market. We analyze three commodity futures markets which have experienced significant price swings in recent years: crude oil, corn and mini-S&P500. Crude oil, for instance rose from $32 per barrel in 2003 to $145 in July 2008 and fell to $35 by December 2008 before rebounding to $50 in March 2009 at the end of our sample (see Figure 1) . Similar market-wide swings occur in both corn and the mini-S&P500 futures markets as well (Figures 2 and 3) .
We explore whether these patterns of price trends and reversals can be attributed to the trading of hedge funds and swap dealers-institutions that perhaps bring market moving information to futures markets. Indeed, increased participation from each of these groups has led many to link their trading to price fluctuations. In crude oil, for instance, hedge fund market share (of open interest) has doubled from 20 to 40 percent since 2000. Similarly, the swap dealer business has grown to service both commodity index investors as well as over-the-counter (OTC) activity. 1 These institutions arguably bring market moving information to futures markets. Hedge funds, for instance, apply sophisticated modeling techniques for trading. Swap dealers bring over-the-counter (OTC) positions from sophisticated entities onto to the organized exchange. Likewise, swap dealers convey the growing order flow from commodity index investment into the organized exchange. In both ways, swap dealer positions may contain valuable information from both off-exchange positions and the sophisticated diversifying positions of the index investment crowd.
We find evidence that hedge fund activity does contain valuable information for predicting trend reversals (in the forecasting sense) for both crude oil and corn futures. Conversely, hedge fund activity does not appear to influence the S&P500 index futures market, suggesting that sophisticated hedge fund analysis may add little value to the deep and liquid index futures markets. Swap dealer activity also appears to contribute little to maintaining or reversing market trends in any of these markets. This result suggests that passive long positions placed by index investors have little effect on price trends or reversals. Likewise, the fact that OTC positions have little effect might help to allay concerns that central market prices might be somehow unduly influenced by OTC activity.
We apply Markov switching models as a systematic approach to modeling different financial asset data series which occasionally exhibit multiple breaks and regime shifts in the data generating process. 2 Many authors have argued that nonlinear processes model the behavior of financial variables better than linear processes. The Markov switching approach accommodates well the linkages between positions of market participants and price trends or reversals.
We adopt data from the Large Trader Reporting System collected by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The CFTC collects detailed data on several trader categories for surveillance purposes. All large traders must report net positions to the CFTC on a daily basis. Traders are classified most generally as commercial and noncommercial, depending on their risk exposure to the underlying commodity. Within the commercial category are subcategories of producers, manufacturers, dealers and swap dealers, for example, while non-commercial traders include hedge funds and floor traders. 3 For our analysis we use daily positions of hedge funds, swap dealers and broker/dealers, The existence of different market regimes has important implications for a variety of constituents. Whether the evolution of regimes is deterministic or stochastic, the existence of regimes is important to portfolio managers, liquidity providers and market regulators alike. Portfolio managers, for instance, can adopt regime dependent strategies to maximize risk-adjusted returns in this setting. 4 Liquidity providers, who learn from order flow, might more effectively manage inventories with better information about the transition probability of regime changes. In addition, market regulators concerned about long-term trends, reversals and bubbles in market prices might more effectively implement policy choices with a better understanding of regimes and the determinants of regime switching.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the econometric methodology. In section III we describe the data in detail. Section VI discusses empirical findings. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Methodology
Some of the stylized facts in finance show that asset returns exhibit leptokurtosis, volatility clustering and heteroskedasticity. The GARCH model is able to capture these stylized facts rather well. In fact, our approach begins from the GARCH(p,q) model which allows to jointly model the conditional mean and the conditional variance of asset returns:
, are the exogenous and/or lagged variables for the conditional mean, Ω is the information set available at time t-1, and i refers to returns on crude oil, corn and mini S&P500.
3 The CFTC produces weekly Commitments of Traders reports to the public on a partially disaggregated basis for four separate groups and periodically audits the data to ensure accuracy.
We may distinguish between two different regimes: bull market and bear market. This implies that the two regimes should have different (unconditional) means and may also have different variances. Usually bearish markets are associated with higher volatility levels. Gray (1996) and Dueker (1997) introduce Markov regime switching in the GRACH framework. In fact, the above equations can be written as , , 
The constant, , in the conditional mean equation is allowed to switch between two regimes -positive mean, bull market, ( ), and low mean, bear market ( ),
,
where is the latent Markov chain of order 1. We are assuming that the parameter vector , in the conditional mean equation is constant (i.e. it does not switch according to the Markov process) but this assumption can be easily relaxed. The innovation term, , , follows a normal distribution. In the volatility literature there is substantial evidence showing that the GARCH(1,1) is able to fully capture the volatility dynamics of asset returns. Our data confirm this result for all the three markets analyzed. Therefore, in what follows, to simplify notation we will concentrate on the GARCH(1,1) case. Dueker (1997) adopts a student-t distribution for the error term. We started our empirical analysis assuming a student-t distribution for the innovations. The estimated degrees of freedom where very high, for this reason we decided to use the normal distribution. The conditional variance, , , is a function of the entire history of the state variable. This is due to the autoregressive term, , , in the conditional variance equation -see Dueker (1997) , Cai (1994) , and Hamilton and Susmel (1994) . Obviously, it is very demanding to account for all the past history of the state variable. Following Dueker (1997) , we adopt an approximation procedure that seems not to cause any problems in the evaluation of the likelihood function. This procedure implies that the conditional variance is a function of only the most recent values of the state variable. Dueker (1997) shows that in a GARCH(1,1) model we need to consider only the most recent two values of the state variable. This means that the conditional variance, , , is a function only of the current state ( ) and the previous state ( ): , ,
The above equation implies that the constant in the conditional variance equation is allowed to switch. In turn, this implies that the unconditional variances in the bull market and the unconditional variance in the bear markets are allowed to be different. Following Dueker (1997) , is parameterized as · such that 1 is normalized to unity. In this setup the transition probabilities are constant. This seems over-restrictive. Transition probabilities may depend on the trading activity of market participants. For this reason, we introduce time varying probabilities. In our setup transition probabilities are Probit functions of traders' positions, denoted by Zt
where Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the normal distribution, and ς and υ are parameters. This approach allows forecasting the conditional probability of being in a given regime (a; b) at time t+1 given the information available at time t. Denote by , | the (N × 1) vector of conditional probabilities of being in state (0,1) at time t, conditional on the information until t. Define , as the (N × 1) vector of the density of , conditional on . Following Hamilton (1994) , the optimal forecast for each t is computed by iterating the following equations
where 1 denotes the unit vector, , is the (N × N) Markov transition probability matrix and denotes the element-by-element multiplication. In this framework, , is time varying as function of the positions of hedge funds (for all the markets analyzed), swap dealers (for crude oil and corn), and arbitrageurs or broker/dealer (for the mini S&P500). This approach allows us to compute the probability of moving from bull to bear markets (and vice versa) in period t+1 given the trading behavior of market participants at time t. 
, √2
where 0,1 relates to 0,1 and 0,1 relates to 0,1 , see Hamilton (1994) .
III. Data
We select futures contracts that represent three different categories of assets: energy (crude oil), agriculture (corn), and stocks (mini-SP 500).
Our dataset covers the period of January 2, 2003 through March 19, 2009 . During this time period, the role of speculators has been heavily criticized. This is particularly true for energy and agricultural markets.
For each market analyzed, we use two different datasets: (i) daily futures rate of returns and (ii) daily net futures positions of the two most important categories of market participants (one commercial one non-commercial) in each market. For the non-commercial one, we always analyzed hedge fund (HF) activity. This is indeed the most important noncommercial category in each market in terms of market share (open interest). For the commercial category, we analyze swap dealer (AS) positions for crude oil and corn, and arbitrageurs/broker/dealer (FA) for the mini-S&P500. 5 For each market we concentrate on the nearby contract (closest to delivery). Before maturity (the expiration date), market participants roll over their positions from the nearby contract (March 2005, say) to the next-to-nearby contract (June 2005) . This behavior generates some type of seasonality in the data. To mitigate these problems, the roll-over strategy In what follows we describe the data in some detail.
A. Futures Market Return Data
Crude oil is listed on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and is one of the world's most actively traded commodities. It is traded on both an electronic platform and an open auction. Daily settlement prices refer to the prevailing price at 2:30 p.m. EST, when the open auction closes. Futures contracts on corn are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Corn is becoming increasingly important for the production of ethanol. We compute daily returns using settlement prices which are set by the exchange at the close of 5 Broker: A person paid a fee or commission for executing buy or sell orders for a customer. In commodity futures trading, the term may refer to: (1) Floor broker, a person who actually executes orders on the trading floor of an exchange; (2) Account executive or associated person, the person who deals with customers in the offices of futures commission merchants; or (3) the futures commission merchant. Dealer: An individual or firm that acts as a market maker in an instrument such as a security or foreign currency. Source: http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/glossary/index.htm the trading day (2:15 p.m. EST). The last market considered is the mini-S&P500 stock futures index, which is traded on CME. The contract trades only electronically on Globex.
Daily returns are constructed as Tables 1, column one, reports summary statistics for the return processes. Daily returns on crude oil have a negative mean and high standard deviation. The unconditional distribution is non-Gaussian with negative skew and kurtosis in excess of three. Natural gas exhibits also a significant negative average daily return (-7.6% annually) and a very large standard deviation. Similar to crude oil, corn exhibits negative skewness and high kurtosis. The negative return for the mini-S&P500 is mainly due to the financial crisis and the recession that followed soon after the crisis. Interestingly, the mini-S&P500 has the lowest standard deviation over the sample among the three assets analyzed.
B. Market Participants' Positions
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission collects and stores data on the positions of traders that hold contracts above specific levels set by the CFTC. 6 The total amount of all trader positions reported to the CFTC represents approximately 70 to 90 percent of total open interest in any market, while the remainder is traders who generally trade a small number of contracts, known as Non-Reportable Positions (NRP). When a trader is identified to the CFTC, the trader is classified either as a commercial or non-commercial. A trader's reported futures position is determined to be commercial if the trader uses futures contracts for the purposes of hedging as defined by CFTC regulations. The non-commercial category includes participants who are not involved in the underlying cash business. 7 In this paper we concentrate on two categories of market participants: commodity swap dealers and hedge funds. There is no formal definition of a hedge fund in the Commodity Exchange Act, the statute that regulates the CFTC. 8 Accordingly, there is not a requirement that hedge funds be categorized in the LTRS. However, many hedge fund complexes are registered as Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs), 9 Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) 10 and/or Associated Persons (APs), 11 who may control customer accounts. In addition to these three categories of traders, market surveillance staff at the CFTC identifies other participants who are not registered in any of these three categories but are known to be managing money (MM). These four categories combined are defined as being the hedge fund category. We actually check the names of the funds in these four categories with those listed in press reports as hedge funds, and we find that many of the large CPOs, CTAs, APs and MMs are generally considered to be hedge funds and hedge fund operators.
In commodity markets, commercial commodity swap/derivatives dealers (henceforth, swap dealers), play an important role. This category of market participants uses derivative markets for two main reasons: i) to manage their price exposure originating from their over-the-counter (OTC) business; and ii) to manage their transactions with commodity index funds. These funds are often employed by large institutions that seek diversification by investing in commodities. For this reason commodity index funds hold significant longonly positions, especially in near-term futures contracts. The controversy regarding swap dealers owes to the fact that they are classified as commercial traders (i.e. hedgers) -indeed these market participants are hedging their price exposure -but they are often trading to fulfill the needs of commodity index funds that are entering commodity markets to have an exposure in these markets. Over our sample, commodity index funds have experienced a significant growth. 12 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the level and first difference of the net futures positions of each category of market participants organized by market. While the level of open interest indicates the stock of the positions held by market participants, the first difference represent the trading activity of these participants. Table 1 indicates that over the sample analyzed, hedge funds are on average net long in the three markets considered. The negative mean in the change in position indicates that, hedge funds overall reduced their position in all markets analyzed. Swap dealers in crude oil and corn have a net positive position. This is to be expected given that this category of market participants invests in commodity markets for diversification purposes. Swap dealers increase their participation in the crude oil market. In fact, the first difference of swap dealer positions in this market is positive. However, they reduced slightly their positions in the corn market. Arbitrageurs/brokers/dealers have a net short position in the mini-S&P500. This category of market participants is in this market for hedging purposes. FA positions decreased over our sample. Interestingly, hedge fund positions in all markets are stationary, indicating that "Associated Person (AP): An individual who solicits or accepts (other than in a clerical capacity) orders, discretionary accounts, or participation in a commodity pool, or supervises any individual so engaged, on behalf of a futures commission merchant, an introducing broker, a commodity trading advisor, a commodity pool operator, or an agricultural trade option merchant." Source: Glossary of the CFTC (http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/glossary/index.htm). 12 By June 2008, the notional value of commodity index investments tied to U.S. futures exchanges exceeded 160 billion dollars (CFTC, 2008) . Although we are only considering two categories of market participants in each market, these participants play an important role in terms of share of total open interest. Table 1 we analyze net futures positions of market traders, in Table 2 we concentrate on the long and the short components of trader positions. Table 3 shows that hedge funds are present on both size of the market (long and short) in more or less equal amounts. As expected swap dealers are mainly long and only occasionally short. Arbitrageurs/brokers/dealers hold a large portion of the open interest in the mini-S&P500 and are mainly short indicating that this category of market participants is hedging price exposure using futures. The low standard deviation in hedge fund positions indicates that this category of market participants does not change their portfolio very often.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Crude Oil A.1. Estimation Results Table 3 presents five models for the crude oil futures market. Model (1,1) refers to the model in which the transition probability only contains a constant and do not include any explanatory variable. The simple model (1,1) suggests that in the bear market returns on crude oil are, on average, negative and volatility is 19 times higher than bull market. On the other hand, in the bull market returns on crude oil are positive and volatility levels are lower. High volatility levels are, therefore associated to a bearish market. This is in line with previous results -see Maheu and McCurdy (1999) , and Cunado, Gil-Alana, Perez de Gracia (2008). On average, change in prices is much lower during bull market, suggesting that the market goes up more smoothly than it goes down. Estimates of the parameters α and β indicate that the volatility process is highly persistent. This is a classic result in the GARCH literature. We also explore richer structures for the GARCH parameterization and find that the simple GARCH(1,1) is able to describe the volatility dynamic rather well.
We extend our simple model by allowing level of, or change in, hedge fund and swap dealer trading activity into our transition probability estimates. The model(3,3), therefore, incorporates two new variable in addition to a constant term in the transition probabilities.
We distinguish between long and short positions (columns 2 and 4) or positive and negative change in positions (columns 3 and 5). We do so for two reasons. First, we would like to verify whether net short positions (or a reduction in positions) have different effects on the transition probability than long (increased) positions. It might, in fact, be reasonable to assume that short and long positions may impact bull and bear markets differently. Second, it is easier to interpret the results -e.g. if short positions are characterized by a negative coefficient in the transition probabilities, then this will result in a positive effect on the probability (higher probability). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) chooses Model (3,3) over Model (1,1) in both cases: level and change in net positions of hedge fund and swap dealer trading activity. This means that there is valuable information in these variables.
Hedge fund positions in levels are statistically important and the coefficients indicate that hedge funds positions decrease the likelihood of staying in the same regime. Specifically, when hedge funds are net long in bear markets or short in the bull markets, the probability of staying in the respective state will go down. Basically, when they go against the market trend, then they have significant effects. Interestingly, in both cases, net trading position of hedge funds reverse the market trend and bring about price reversal. Our finding provide further evidence of stabilizing effect of hedge fund trading activity suggested by Brunetti and Buyuksahin (2009) We also analyze the effect of the change in net positions of hedge funds. The probability of staying in bull market falls when hedge funds increase their net short position. Once again, it seems that hedge fund trading activity is producing price reversals. In bear markets, however, we did not find statistically significant effects of change in hedge funds net positions.
Swap dealers net futures position (long or short), as expected, do not have any statistically significant effect on the transition probabilities. Swap dealers might be considered passive investors and are in these markets mainly for diversification purposes. Change in swap dealer positions in bear market will have an effect on the probabilities. Specifically, the probability of staying in bear markets increases when swap dealers increase their net short position. In other words, if the market is falling and swap dealers are reducing their net positions in the crude oil market, then the probability of remaining in the same bad state increases.
A.2. Transition Probabilities
Transition probabilities provide valuable information on the ability of hedge funds and swap dealers trading activity of anticipating market movements. Figure 2 panel A shows the estimated transition probabilities of moving from state one (bull market and low volatility) to state zero (bear market and high volatility) for the model (3,3) in which transition probabilities depend on hedge fund positions in levels. Panel A also reports the price level of crude oil. In May 2006 the probability of moving from a bull market to a bear market jumps from 13 percent to 31 percent. In absolute terms, the value of 31 percent may not seem very high. However, the average probability of moving from bull markets to bear market is below 10 percent. Therefore, in relative terms 31 percent probability of switching to a state with negative returns and high volatility is quite high. This probability stays high until October 2007, well before the price of crude oil starts to decline in June 2008. A possible interpretation of these results is that hedge funds posses either private information or they employ good forecasting models and trade accordingly.
Panel B depicts the probability of moving from state zero (bear market) to state one (bull market). It is interesting to note the last part of the graph. At the end of December 2008 this probability jumps from 9 percent to 77 percent. This is a clear indication that the price of crude oil will go up. Although our dataset ends on March 2009, we are well aware that oil price increased rapidly after March 2009. It seems that hedge funds trading strategies were aware of these price increases already in December 2008.
A clarification is in order at this point. We are analyzing transition probabilities which only indicate the possibility of moving from one regime to another. It will be incorrect to interpret these results as evidence that hedge funds move the market.
Swap dealer activity does not provide any valuable information in the transition probabilities. This is to be expected given that this category of market participants is mainly long and use futures on crude oil only for diversification purposes. Table 4 presents estimation results for futures contracts on corn. The simple model (1,1) suggests that in state zero (bear market) corn futures drop, on average, 0.1 basis points. Bear markets are also characterized by high volatility. In fact, volatility in bear markets is 6 times higher than that in bull markets. The volatility process is very persistent (α+β=0.988).
B. Corn B.1. Estimation Results
The Akaike information criterion suggests that hedge funds and swap dealers positions may contain relevant information in modeling the transition probabilities. However, the level of hedge fund activity does not produce any statistically significant coefficient in the transition probabilities (see column 2 in Table 4 ). Hedge fund trading activity (position in 1 st difference) is only marginally significant in P11, the probability of being in the bull market regime. The coefficient (-0.987) indicates that when hedge funds increase their position in the corn market (i.e. when they buy) the probability of staying in bull market decreases. This may indicate some kind of momentum (overshooting) generated by hedge funds trading.
Interestingly, swap dealers positions in levels significantly affect the probability of being in the bear market (P00). In particular, when swap dealers are net long, the probability of staying in a bear market decreases and when they are net short this probability increases. In other words, swap dealers treading may help moving from a bear market to a bull market when they are buying while the reverse is true when they are selling. We conjecture that these results do not imply that swap dealers may have superior information. As already mentioned, swap dealers invest in commodities for diversification purposes. They might be attracted by a commodity with a relative low price (i.e. when the commodity is in state zero). This trading behavior may help reverting from a bear market to a bull market. Figure 3 shows transition probabilities for the model (3,3) together with futures prices on corn. Panel A refers to the probability of moving from state zero (bear market) to state one (bull market) in next period conditional on the trading activity of hedge funds. On March 12, 2009 this probability jumps from one percent to 36 percent. This jump implies that the likelihood of the corn market to move from a negative return to a positive return is much higher. In fact, after our sample ends, corn futures prices increased substantially. Similar to the results for crude oil, we find that hedge funds trading activity may be helpful in explaining the transition from a bear market to a bull market.
B.2. Transition Probabilities
Swap dealers activity does not provide useful information in the transition probabilities. In fact, even in the case where the coefficients are statistically significant (see column 4 in Table 4 ), transition probabilities are uninformative. C. Mini-S&P500
B.1. Estimation Results
Estimation results for the mini-S&P500 are reported in Table 5 . The model with constant transition probabilities (1,1) indicates that bear markets are characterized by higher volatility. In particular, volatility levels in bear markets are 3.6 times higher than those in bull markets. Similar to the results in crude oil and corn, estimates of α and β indicate that volatility in the stock market is highly persistent.
In this market, while hedge funds are the largest non-commercial trader category, arbitrageurs/ brokers lead in the commercial traders in terms of open interest.
It is interesting to note that when conditioning the transition probabilities to hedge fund activity, the value of the log-likelihood and the Akaike criterion indicate that there is not any substantial information gain. In other words, hedge funds positions do not contain valuable information for our model in this market. Accordingly, we only find a statistical significant coefficient (see column 2 in Table 5 ) which indicates that hedge funds short positions increase the likelihood of staying in the bear market.
We conjecture that hedge funds may enter this market with different purposes and may implement different trading strategies than those implemented in the crude oil and in the corn markets. Hedge funds are renowned to use a wide range of investment techniques and to explore new investment opportunities. On this regard, the stock market may not seem very attractive to this category of market participants.
Net positions of arbitrageurs, brokers and dealers play an important role in the transition probabilities. In fact, AIC selects the model (3,3) (see columns 4 and 5 in Table  5 ). Estimation results show that arbitrageurs, brokers and dealers increase the likelihood of staying in the bear market when they are net long and increase the likelihood of staying in the bull market when they are net short. It seems that the trading behavior of this category of market participants does not revert the trend but, somehow, contributes to the trend. Similar considerations hold for the first difference of net positions of arbitrageurs, brokers and dealers. Brokers and dealers provide liquidity to informed traders. Therefore their trading activity produces reverse effects than those of informed traders. This may explain why brokers and dealers may in fact exacerbate bull and bear markets. Figure 4 depicts transition probabilities of moving from state zero (bear market) to state one (bull market) for the mini-S&P500 conditional on net futures positions of hedge funds. Although estimation results show that hedge fund positions only provide limited information for the transition probabilities in this market, Panel A in Figure 4 has an interesting result: the probability of moving to a bull market is low and remains low until the end of our sample. This implies that as for March 19 th , 2009, there is no evidence that the bear market will revert to a bull market. A similar conclusion actually emerges from Panel B in Figure 4 which graphs the transition probability from state zero to state one conditional on net futures positions of arbitrageurs, brokers and dealers.
C.2. Transition Probabilities Panel A in

V. Conclusions
In recent years we experienced two main phenomena. First, many assets including crude oil, corn and the S&P500 experienced a prices increase followed by a sudden price decrease. Second, at the same time hedge fund and swap dealer activity increased dramatically in these markets. Although many studies investigate the relationship between these two events and find that speculation activity did not destabilize markets, we propose a different and more sophisticated approach to investigate the linkages between these two phenomena. Most of the existing literature investigates the direct effect of speculation on prices and volatility. We, instead, are interested in testing the hypothesis whether institutional traders contain valuable information not for prices and volatilities, but for the transition probabilities that govern the underlying Markov process between two different states: bull and bear markets. Interestingly, we find that hedge fund activity does contain valuable information for the transition probabilities. In particular, our results indicate that hedge fund activity contributed to trend reversal. Moreover, hedge fund activity is able to forecast regime changes. This last point is of particular importance. It seems that for crude oil and corn, hedge funds have private information. We conjecture that this is due to the fact that hedge funds invest heavily in quantitative modeling techniques. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that hedge funds have more accurate forecasting models. This is not the case for swap dealers who are considered to be passive investor. Swap dealers are mainly long in these markets and their main purpose is to diversify their portfolios.
There is no evidence that hedge funds have private information in the S&P500. In this market arbitrageurs, brokers and dealers seem to influence transition probabilities. LogLik.
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